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Nontechnical Summary 
 
Human capital investments of firms impose the risk that outsider firms poach trained worker 
because, in contrast to real capital investments, firms do not have the right of disposal for 
human capital investments. Since firms invest in general human capital, economic theory 
discusses how market imperfections create partial monopsony power for training firms. Such 
monopsony power permits general human capital investments of firms and reduce the 
poaching probability. 
 
However to date, there have not been any empirical studies investigating the existence and 
extent of poaching after general human capital investments. This paper solves the empirical 
challenges to identify poaching and shows that around three per cent of the German 
apprenticeship training firms are poaching victims. Poaching is more likely to be observed in 
large firms that pay high earnings, whereas smaller firms that pay lower earnings are able to 
retain their most productive apprenticeship graduates. 
 
This finding contrasts common arguments stating that low-earnings firms are more likely to 
be poaching victims. Instead, a firm’s current economic status determines the likelihood of 
becoming a poaching victim. During a downsizing period, training firms may not be able to 
make counter-offers for apprenticeship graduates that they would like to employ. Workforce 
reduction signals to outsider firms that they can hire high-quality employees for relatively 
small earnings premiums. Finally, we find that poaching victims respond to poaching by 
slightly reducing the share of new apprentice intakes, but they do not adjust earnings for 
apprenticeship graduates in their first jobs as skilled employees. 
 
We conclude that the overall importance of poaching on expected returns to apprenticeship 
training and firms’ training decisions seems to be negligible. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Wenn Betriebe in Aus- und Weiterbildung investieren, gehen sie das Risiko einer Abwerbung 
der ausgebildeten Fachkräfte durch Konkurrenten ein, da die Betriebe, im Gegensatz zu 
Sachkapitalinvestitionen, durch die Aus- und Weiterbildungsinvestitionen kein 
Verfügungsrecht an ihrer Investition erhalten. Daher werden seit vielen Jahren 
Marktmechanismen diskutiert, welche eine Investition der Betriebe in das Humankapital der 
Mitarbeiter erklären. Diese theoretischen Modelle nutzen Marktunvollkommenheiten, um eine 
Monopsonmacht der Ausbildungsbetriebe zu modellieren, welche die Bildungsinvestitionen 
möglich macht. Durch diese Marktunvollkommenheiten kann die Abwerbung ausgebildeter 
Fachkräfte minimiert werden. 
 
Über die tatsächliche Verbreitung von Abwerbungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ist bisher jedoch 
empirisch nichts bekannt. Der vorliegende Beitrag löst die empirischen Probleme zur 
Identifikation von Abwerbung und zeigt, dass auf dem deutschen Ausbildungsmarkt nur ca. 3 
Prozent der Ausbildungsfirmen von Abwerbung betroffen sind. Diese betroffenen Betriebe 
sind jedoch im Durchschnitt eher große Betriebe mit hoher Ausbildungsneigung, die 
überdurchschnittliche Löhne zahlen als ihre Konkurrenten. 
 
Dieser Befund widerspricht bisherigen Vermutungen, dass kleinere Firmen eher von 
Abwerbung betroffen sind. Von Abwerbung betroffene Betriebe befinden sich jedoch 
größtenteils in einer Phase temporären Arbeitskräfteabbaus und sind daher nicht in der Lage, 
Abwerbungsinitiativen von anderen Firmen zu unterbinden. Die einmalige Abwerbung von 
Absolventen der beruflichen Erstausbildung hat jedoch keinen Einfluss auf die 
Ausbildungsneigung und die Löhne der Facharbeiter. Allerdings reduzieren die Betriebe, die 
von Abwerbung betroffen wurden, die Anteil der Ausbildungsstellen an der 
Gesamtbeschäftigung ein wenig. 
 
Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Relevanz von Abwerbung auf dem Ausbildungsmarkt auf 
die erwarteten Rückflüsse von Ausbildungsinvestitionen und die Ausbildungsneigung der 
Betriebe in Deutschland vernachlässigbar ist. 
 
POACHING AND FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING: 
FIRST CLEAN EVIDENCE∗ 
 
Jens Mohrenweiser (ZEW Mannheim) 
Thomas Zwick (Würzburg University, ZEW Mannheim and ROA Maastricht) 
Uschi Backes-Gellner (University of Zurich) 
 
This version: May 2013 
 
ABSTRACT: 
A series of seminal theoretical papers argues that poaching of employees may hamper 
company-sponsored general training. However, the extent of poaching, its determinants and 
consequences, remains an open empirical question. We provide a novel empirical 
identification strategy for poaching and investigate its causes and consequences. We find that 
only a small number of training firms in Germany are poaching victims. Firms are more likely 
to poach employees during an economic downturn. Training firms respond to poaching by 
lowering the share of new apprentice intakes in the following years. 
 
JEL Codes: J24, M51, M53 
Key words: poaching, company sponsored training, recruiting, apprenticeship 
 
 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author Jens Mohrenweiser: mohrenweiser@zew.de. Telephone: 0049 621 1235160 
We are grateful for the discussion and comments by Giorgio Brunello, Simon Janssen, Raymond Montizaan, 
Christian Pfeifer, Dario Pozzoli, Paul Ryan, Stefan Wolter, and Ludger Wössmann. The research was partly 
supported by the Swiss Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology through its Leading House on 
Economics of Education, Firm Behaviour and Training Policies. We thank the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of 
the Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research for the data access and the support 
with analysis of the LIAB data. Data access was via guest research spells at FDZ and afterwards via controlled 
data remote access at the FDZ. The data basis of this paper is the LIAB longitudinal version 2. 
 1 
1 Introduction 
Employers often pay for employee training even if accumulated skills are general and 
transferable to other employers (Barron et al., 1999; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999; Booth 
and Bryan, 2005; Bassanini et al., 2007). A number of theoretical studies have analysed 
incentives for companies to sponsor training in general human capital in situations where 
other firms can poach trained employees. If poaching occurs, the training firm loses its 
training investment and the raiding firm can meet its skill demand without paying for 
training. Consequently, poaching and the threat of poaching can lead to underinvestment in 
training by firms concerned about losing their investment. Theoretical models predict a 
coexistence of poaching and firm-sponsored general training – training costs pay off because 
the poaching probability is small and the majority of trainees stay with the training firm 
(Stevens, 1996, 2001; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, 1999b; Booth and Zoega, 2004; 
Leuven, 2005; Lazear, 2009).  
To date, there have not been any empirical studies investigating the existence and extent of 
poaching (Pischke, 2007; Brunello and De Paola, 2009). The main reason for this remarkable 
gap in the literature is difficulty in identifying poached trainees. There are two identification 
requirements: first, the training firm has to have an interest in retaining the training 
participant and, second, an outsider firm must be willing to pay higher earnings than the 
training participant would get at the training firm. 
This paper introduces a novel approach to solve these empirical challenges and identifies 
poached trainees by exploiting several particularities of the German apprenticeship training 
system. This system mandatorily prescribes transferable skills which must be trained in each 
occupation in each training year. This ensures that apprentices perform and learn the same 
type of tasks. We argue that therefore earnings differences during the training period within 
one firm and occupation are related to relative productivity differences between apprentices. 
We exploit earning variance to identify the interest of training firms to retain apprenticeship 
graduates. 
We infer that the training firm wishes to retain a leaving apprenticeship graduate if the 
graduate receives higher earnings at the end of the apprenticeship than his or her staying 
peers (this is our first poaching condition – interest to keep). The outsider firm poaches if the 
leaving apprenticeship graduate earns more with the new firm than any of the staying 
apprenticeship graduates (second poaching condition – earnings mark-up). 
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Our empirical analysis shows that around 3 per cent of training firms are poaching victims. 
We observe that poaching and raiding firms are more likely to be large firms that pay high 
earnings, whereas smaller firms that pay lower earnings are able to retain their most 
productive apprenticeship graduates. This finding contrasts common arguments stating that 
low-earnings firms are more likely to be poaching victims. Instead, a firm’s current economic 
status determines the likelihood of becoming a poaching victim. During a downsizing period, 
training firms may not be able to make counter-offers for apprenticeship graduates that they 
would like to employ. Workforce reduction signals to outsider firms that they can hire high-
quality employees for relatively small earnings premiums. Thus, raiding firms exploit current 
weaknesses of training firms and hire well-trained apprenticeship graduates they otherwise 
would not have been able to attract. Finally, we find that poaching victims respond to 
poaching by slightly reducing the share of new apprentice intakes, but they do not adjust 
earnings for apprenticeship graduates in their first jobs as skilled employees. 
The poaching risk seems to be low in Germany and caused mainly by temporary downsizing 
of poaching victims. Therefore, we conclude that poaching has no strong influence on the 
expected returns from training, and hence firms’ training decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The next section reviews the literature. 
The third and fourth sections briefly describe the institutional setting of apprenticeship 
training in Germany and the data. Afterwards, we present our identification strategy for 
poached trainees and describe firms that are poaching victims in comparison with raiding 
firms and firms not affected by poaching. The seventh section analyses the response to 
poaching. The last sections discuss consequences for training markets and conclude. 
2 Background Discussion 
There is a long tradition of theoretical papers analysing firms’ incentives to invest in the skills 
of their employees. The main argument for firms’ investment in general human capital of 
employees is that labour market imperfections create a wedge between employees’ post-
training earnings and productivity, and therefore allow firms to recoup training investments1. 
However, these market imperfections can simultaneously promote poaching when a raiding 
firm can earn a rent on the trained skills of a worker by outbidding earnings paid by the 
training firm (Stevens, 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, 1999b; Booth and Zoega, 2004; 
Leuven, 2005). The transferability of the acquired general skills between firms and the 
                                                 
1 These models require two conditions: firms earn profits on workers and these profits increase with training 
level (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a; Leuven, 2005). 
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visibility or transparency of the skills for outsider firms determines the probability of an 
outside offer and, hence, poaching (Lazear, 1986; Stevens, 1996, 2001)2. Poaching is only a 
problem if the future employment is ex-ante non-contractible or trained employees do not 
have to repay training investments. 
Even if poaching and company-sponsored training can coexist, most theoretical contributions 
conclude that poaching hampers training investment in visible and transferable skills because 
a part of the return from that investment accrues to the raiding firm. The training firm only 
invests until marginal costs of training equal expected marginal benefits. Therefore, (the 
threat of) poaching might lead to a lower number of trainees or even to a non-training 
equilibrium (Stevens, 1996, 2001; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a, 1999b; Booth and Zoega, 
2004; Leuven, 2005). 
A number of contributors characterise strategies to prevent poaching. Training firms can get a 
reputation for training quality and credibly offer long-term contracts (Sadowski, 1980; Moen 
and Rosen, 2004). Also, firms may use training investment as a commitment device to reduce 
turnover (Backes-Gellner and Tuor, 2010). Cahuc et al. (1990) split firms with training 
investments into a group that poaches (dominating firms) and a group that loses some of their 
trained employees although this incurs a loss (dominated firms). They show that poaching 
does not necessarily replace a firm’s own training efforts3. 
Although theoretical models show the existence of an equilibrium between poaching and 
training, the identification of the existence, extent and consequences of poaching essentially 
remains an empirical question. So far, empirical papers have shown only that employers pay 
for the costs of training even if the accumulated skills can be transferred to other employers 
(Barron et al., 1999; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999; Booth and Bryan, 2005; Bassanini et 
al., 2007)4. However, some previous studies provide indirect evidence that poaching might 
exist. Booth and Bryan (2005) show that employees’ earnings increases at subsequent 
employers exceed earnings increases for training firms if the employees reported company-
                                                 
2 A growing literature analyses the use of counter-offers. In Lazear (1986) for instance, outside offers are only 
made if the alternative employer is informed and the worker’s productivity exceeds the worker’s wage. The 
employing firm then either matches the offer if productivity is unknown or counters with a wage equal to the 
known productivity of the worker to the firm, which includes a firm-specific component. The raiding firm is 
successful in those cases when this firm-specific component is negative. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004) show a 
“dual labour market” where some firms commit to an offer-matching policy and other firms commit to a policy 
of never making counter-offers. Barron et al. (2006) look at what conditions cause firms to use selective counter-
offers. 
3 See also Combes and Duranton (2006) for a similar approach. 
4 Furthermore, Picchio and van Ours (2011) show that labour market flexibility (or lower search frictions) 
slightly reduces the incentives of firms to invest in training. 
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sponsored training in general skills during the previous year. Similarly, Loewenstein and 
Spletzer (1999) show that employers reward skills acquired during previous employment. 
Moreover, recent empirical studies show that firms typically pay more if they hire employees 
from direct competitors (Kampkötter and Sliwka, 2011). Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012) stress 
that poaching can be profitable for raiding firms. They show that hiring highly educated 
employees from rivalling firms can increase the value added of hiring firms by 1-2 per cent. 
Finally, Mühlemann and Wolter (2011) discuss the potential threat of poaching on firm-
sponsored general training in dense regional labour markets. 
3 Institutional Setting 
An empirical assessment of poaching and its impact on company-sponsored training requires 
an institutional framework which allows researchers to investigate whether firms pay for 
training in transferable and visible skills. The German apprenticeship training system provides 
a unique institutional framework that we will describe in detail in this section. Based on this 
institutional framework, we describe the necessary data in the next section and the precise 
identification of poaching victims in the fifth section. 
Apprenticeship training in Germany traditionally provides the highest professional education 
degree for about two-thirds of the German workforce and is the backbone of medium-skilled 
occupational training. It is subject to a curriculum laid down in the Vocational Training Act 
and occupational specific training curricula. The Vocational Training Act describes the length 
of training, necessary equipment and requirements for training firms. Training firms must 
fulfil these requirements to get a permit for apprenticeship training granted by the Chambers 
of Industry and Commerce or the Chambers of Craft. The training curricula describe 
minimum skills for successful graduation in each training occupation. Apprentices receive 
graded skill certificates at the end of the training period. The Chambers observe training 
quality in each enterprise and administer the final exam on the practical part of the skills 
examination. The theoretical part is administered and graded by publicly funded and 
controlled vocational schools. Therefore, independent public bodies administer the theoretical 
and practical exams and survey the minimum skills acquired during apprenticeship training. 
This institutional framework of apprenticeship training in Germany includes all following 
necessary ingredients required for identifying poaching:  
First, it offers a consistent and unambiguous definition of training across firms. 
Apprenticeship graduates in different firms who are in the same occupation have comparable 
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and guaranteed minimum skills that are monitored and examined by institutions independent 
of the training firms. 
Second, compliance with the training regulations means that training is visible to outsider 
firms. This is guaranteed by the documented and transparent training curriculum and graded 
final exams documenting theoretical, social and practical skills. Therefore, an outsider firm 
knows the skill level of an apprenticeship graduate in a given occupation and can assess the 
quality of the applicant on the basis of the grades. 
Third, skills are not only observable but also transferable. Institutional requirements severely 
limit firms’ ability to reduce general content during apprenticeship training below a certain 
level5. 
Fourth, re-payment of training costs by apprenticeship graduates who leave a firm is not 
permitted by law and future employment of apprenticeship graduates is non-contractible. 
Apprenticeship training contracts legally terminate at the day after the final exam and 
employment has to be negotiated at the end of the apprenticeship. 
Fifth, apprenticeships are a training investment for some occupations, although this differs 
significantly between occupations. Apprentices in blue-collar manufacturing occupations are 
considered to require substantial training investment by firms. Schönfeld et al. (2010) found 
that investment costs for blue-collar apprentices are on average three times higher than those 
for white-collar apprentices. However, white-collar apprentices have been reported to be more 
productive during their apprenticeships and to recoup (most of) their training costs during the 
apprenticeship training period (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009). Therefore, poaching is a 
threat to the willingness to train in expensive blue-collar occupations, whereas for cheaper 
white-collar occupations, poaching might be a minor problem. 
Sixth, apprenticeship graduates who start their first job are a relatively homogeneous group in 
terms of age, tenure and prior education. Therefore, initial labour market conditions - an 
unknown and heterogeneous job history between stayers and movers and differences in 
selectivity at labour market entry (Flinn, 1986; Kahn, 2013) – do not apply because 
apprentices usually have no prior labour market experience and come directly from school. 
The graduates all started their training at the same point in time (and therefore there are no 
differences in occupation selectivity during the business cycle) and their contracts end at the 
                                                 
5 A high share of general contents during apprenticeship training can also be derived from low or non-existent 
wage disadvantages faced by establishment switchers compared with stayers directly after their apprenticeship 
training (Göggel and Zwick, 2012; Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012). 
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same point in time (therefore there are no differences in specific labour demand when they 
start their career as skilled employees). 
Seventh, there are specific rules for wage setting for apprentices. Apprentices’ wages are 
usually set by collective bargaining at the sector level according to § 17 of the Vocational 
Training Act (BBiG). In principle, apprentices in each of the 26 economic sectors defined by 
collective bargaining should earn the same wage irrespective of their occupation6. According 
to § 17 BBiG, a firm also has to pay an appropriate wage when not covered by collective 
bargaining7. The Chambers control whether wages in training contracts are within an accepted 
range. However, there is some leeway for individual wage setting even for employers with 
collective bargaining: A) enterprises are free to voluntarily pay a wage bonus; B) collective 
bargaining agreements might include different earnings level options for apprentices; C) wage 
supplements are possible for especially demanding or dangerous jobs or extra hours. 
Taken together, apprentices receive broadly accepted, visible and transparent training 
certificates at the end of their training period. These skills allow them to accept a skilled job 
either with their training firm or an outsider firm, and to bargain freely their entry earnings as 
skilled workers. 
4 Data 
In addition to the institutional framework, an analysis of poaching requires individual data 
about apprentices who leave the training firm and establishment data about training and 
raiding firms. This information can be obtained from the IAB linked employer-employee data 
set longitudinal version 2 (LIAB). The LIAB combines individual employment statistics from 
social security records with plant-level survey data from the IAB Establishment Panel. The 
distinctive feature of the LIAB is the combination of administrative information on 
individuals and details concerning establishments that employ those individuals. The LIAB 
longitudinal version comprises all establishments with three consecutive entries in the IAB 
Establishment Panel between 1999 and 2002 and all employees who worked at least one day 
in those establishments between 1997 and 2003. The data report complete employment 
histories between 1993 and 2006 (Jacobebbinghaus, 2008). 
                                                 
6 More than two-thirds of apprentices are trained at establishments with collective bargaining and, additionally, 
22% of apprentices work at establishments with wages oriented at collective bargaining (Schönfeld et al., 2010). 
7 A wage is appropriate if it is at most 20 per cent below the collective bargaining rate for apprentices (Lakies 
and Nehls, 2009). 
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However, in our random sample, most graduates do not move between sampled firms but to 
firms not included in the sample. Thus, we merge the Establishment History Panel (EHP) 
using the unique establishment identification number in order to add basic establishment 
characteristics for the firms to which apprenticeship graduates move. The EHP contains 
aggregated establishment-level information (such as employee and earnings structure, size 
and sector)8. We use the LIAB to identify poaching and the EHP to identify establishment 
characteristics of poaching victims and raiding firms. 
The LIAB longitudinal data are particularly well suited for our analysis because employment 
histories are available as spell-data. These spell-data allow a day-based calculation of every 
recruitment, lay-off, status change (for example from apprentice to skilled worker) and 
occupation change for every individual. This allows us to distinguish between three and three-
and-a-half year apprenticeships based on exam days and training duration. Moreover, we use 
the two-digit occupation code to identify the training occupation. Thereby, we calculate the 
exact number of homogeneous apprenticeship graduates at each establishment, occupation 
and graduation year cluster, and use information about earnings and other individual 
characteristics of apprenticeship graduates who stayed and left the training firm. 
We restrict the data to spells after 1998 because reporting the exact day of transition from 
apprenticeship to work was not mandatory before 1999 (Jacobebbinghaus, 2008). We use 
only those apprenticeship graduates with full-time employment in their first jobs after 
apprenticeship and with regular training duration. A regular training duration begins at the 
start of a school year (around September) and terminates in the occupation-specific exam 
week in the first or second quarter of a year. This definition removes drop-outs and 
examination repeaters from our final sample9. Moreover, we drop individuals who earn less 
than 50 percent or more than 200 per cent of the average in their occupation. Also, we do not 
include two-year apprenticeships that mostly contain low-level occupations and drop 
agriculture and non-profit firms. In order to be able to calculate comparison wages between 
movers and stayers, we only include training firms that have at least two apprentices per 
occupation and year. This reduces the sample of training firm observations from about 12300 
(average establishment size is 288) to about 4300 observations with an average establishment 
size of 766. 
We identify poaching according to our two indicators at the individual-level and analyse the 
determinants and consequences of poaching at the establishment-level. We compare firms that 
                                                 
8 The data start on January 1st 1975 or establishments’ founding date. 
9 Around one-quarter of all apprentices drop out before the final exams. 
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are victims of poaching with raiding firms and comparable training firms that could avoid 
poaching in multivariate regressions, in order to reveal systematic differences between the 
three groups. For the analysis of the causes and consequences of poaching, we show graphs of 
the development of firm size and the share of newly hired apprentices before and after 
poaching. Then, we analyse the impact of poaching on the share of newly hired employees 
and entry earnings of skilled employees in multivariate fixed-effects models. This controls for 
time-invariant unobservable establishment characteristics. However, we cannot exclude that 
time-variant unobservable variables such as a change in personnel and training strategy jointly 
affect downsizing and poaching, so our results on triggers of and responses to poaching may 
still be biased. 
5 Identification of Poaching 
After describing the institutional framework for identifying firm-sponsored general training in 
visible and transferable skills and our data set, we proceed with our definition of poaching and 
discuss the conditions for identifying poaching. Previous studies have used the term 
“poaching” with a variety of slightly different meanings, but we define it when the following 
conditions hold: First, the training firm wants to retain an apprenticeship graduate but is not 
able to keep the best or most productive (“interest to keep”). Instead, the best apprenticeship 
graduate leaves the training firm to work for a raiding firm. Second, the raiding firm pays the 
graduate higher earnings than he or she would have received at the training firm (“earnings 
bonus”)10. 
We stress that our poaching definition focuses on graduates changing employers against the 
will of training firms. This means that we focus solely on the perspective of the training firm. 
Usually, apprentices change employers if they receive an outside offer that the training firm 
cannot counter. However, apprentices also may have personal reasons for wishing to change 
firm11. If the training firm attempts to retain such an apprentice by offering higher earnings at 
the end of the apprenticeship but the apprentice still leaves, this is an involuntary quit from 
the training firm’s perspective. 
                                                 
10 For the sake of clean identification of poaching, we concentrate on job entrants after apprenticeship training. 
We therefore exclude a vast area of poaching activities concentrating on experts whose transfer can serve as a 
mechanism for the acquisition of externally developed knowledge (Song et al., 2003). We assume that learning 
by hiring (as a means to enter new product markets, acquisition of internally non-existing knowledge or social 
capital) is only a minor reason for poaching skilled employees at the beginning of their careers. 
11 Cottini et al. (2011) show that an unsupportive boss leads to a 6 percentage point increase in voluntary 
turnover probability for Danish workers. 
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We identify poaching by comparing apprenticeship graduates who stay with an employer, 
with those who switch their employer. We compare stayers with switchers in the same 
occupation who graduate from the same training firm and work in their training occupation 
after graduation12. In addition, switchers have to find a new job within ten days after 
graduation13. This restricts the sample to larger training firms that have staying (and 
switching) apprenticeship graduates in the same training occupation in one graduation year 
(appendix Table B1 summarises shares of staying and switching apprentices). 
In detail, the first poaching condition (“interest to keep”) states that the switching 
apprenticeship graduate is more productive than any other staying apprenticeship graduate. It 
further postulates that the best or most productive apprenticeship graduate is the most 
desirable job candidate and the training firm wants to keep this candidate. This condition 
requires a relative productivity assessment between staying and switching apprentices. The 
first condition includes the possibility that employers plan from the start to retain only a 
certain fraction of apprenticeship graduates because they screen apprentices during the 
apprenticeship (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Wagner and Zwick, 2012)14. 
The second (“earnings bonus”) condition states that a switching apprenticeship graduate 
receive higher earnings at the raiding firm than he or she would get at the training firm. This 
condition implies that the training firm was unable or unwilling to counter the offer by the 
raiding firm. According to this condition, it is also possible that the training firm is willing to 
bid up earnings of the leaving apprenticeship graduate to his or her productivity level but 
assesses the productivity of the leaving apprenticeship graduate at a lower level than the 
raiding firm. 
In contrast to institutional regulations stating that earnings for all apprentices should be equal, 
we find striking earnings variations between apprentices in the same training year, in the same 
occupation and at the same training establishment. The standard deviation of apprentices’ 
earnings at the end of apprenticeship is 0 for only 4.4 per cent of training establishments with 
at least one moving and one staying apprenticeship graduate. Most training establishments 
pay their apprentices slightly different earnings, even comparing apprentices with similar 
                                                 
12 We do not consider occupation switchers because occupations differ with respect to average earnings level, 
reputation and selectivity. We also exclude apprenticeship graduates with an unemployment spell after 
graduation because that may be a stigma. 
13 These “immediate” employer switchers make up 10 per cent of all apprenticeship graduates in our sample. 
Moreover, short non-employment spells of switchers are usually interpreted as a sign of quitting rather than 
firing. Most transitions take place during the first three days. 
14 Author (2001) also shows that temporary help firms use training as a screening period and therefore 
voluntarily let trained employees go. 
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characteristics. The average dispersion of earnings is 2.03 Euros a day – this difference 
accounts for around 7 per cent of the daily gross earnings within a firm, occupation and 
graduation year cell (Table 1)15. 
We interpret earnings differences between apprentices at the end of their apprenticeship 
within the same establishment and occupation as relative differences in productivity and 
therefore the attractiveness of retaining an apprentice. This argument is supported by the fact 
that earnings variation within an establishment/occupation/graduation year cell triples when 
the final exam approaches (Appendix: Figure A1). The increase in apprentice earnings 
variation illustrates that employers monitor apprentice productivity and reward those that are 
more productive. We collect further arguments for this hypothesis in appendix A of this 
paper. 
The small earnings differences at the end of the apprenticeship training are not visible to 
outsider firms, only the external researcher. Apprenticeship graduates in one training firm, 
occupation and graduation year cell are heterogeneous to outsider firms in terms of practical 
and theoretical exam grades and other individual characteristics such as schooling background 
or age. This means that certification at the end of apprenticeship allows (potential) raiding 
firms, at least to a certain extent, to assess differences in quality of apprentices (Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 2000)16. 
We find that 33 per cent of immediately moving “best” apprenticeship graduates earn more 
than the best-paid stayer at the end of the apprenticeship, see Table 2, column 217. In more 
detail, 24 per cent of all immediate movers in expensive blue-collar manufacturing 
occupations earn more than those who stayed with the training firm at the end of the 
apprenticeship. This share is somewhat lower than that for cheaper white-collar occupations 
(41 per cent)18. 
                                                 
15 The average apprentice salary within an establishment/occupation cluster is 28.60 Euros a day. 
16 Information on relative graduate quality in the training firms therefore might be symmetric, because the 
relevant quality differences are credibly documented by certificates. Schönberg (2007) also shows that employer 
learning is symmetric in the case of German apprentices. 
17 In order to identify both poaching conditions, we make sure that the poaching and raiding establishments do 
not simply belong to the same company. Therefore, we analyse employee flow between firms and delete all 
cases when more than 10 per cent of all out- or inflowing employees switch between a poaching victim and the 
respective raiding firm. This procedure leads to an exclusion of 10.5 per cent of potential poaching victims. 
18 The high proportions of the best leaving apprentice on all immediate moving apprentices can result from 
firms’ earnings policy to motivate good apprentices to stay (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2013). The firm can use 
higher earnings offers to compensate the disutility of a worker who has preferences to work closer to his or her 
home, is not satisfied with his or her colleagues, supervisors, career perspectives or work environment 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). Indeed, only in 5 per cent of all cases are immediately moving graduates the 
best-paid apprentices in their occupation/establishment/graduation year cell. 
 11 
Indeed, the decision by the “best apprentice” to leave a training firm might be a consequence 
of individual preference and not a superior offer from an outside firm. Therefore, we 
additionally impose the second condition that raiding firms are willing to offer an earnings 
bonus for switching apprenticeship graduates. Calculation of earnings bonuses for switching 
apprenticeship graduates requires counterfactual earnings, that is earnings that a leaving 
apprenticeship graduate would have received if he or she stayed with the training firm. We 
construct the counterfactual earnings level as the highest earnings of those apprenticeship 
graduates in the same cell who stay with the training firm. These earnings are the highest 
revealed willingness by the training firm to pay for an apprenticeship graduate. Table 3 shows 
that 30 per cent of all immediate movers indeed earn more than the best-paid staying 
apprenticeship graduate in their first regular jobs. This proportion is again lower for 
immediately moving apprenticeship graduates in expensive blue-collar manufacturing 
occupations (22 per cent) than in white-collar occupations (40 per cent). 
The second condition alone is also not sufficient to identify poaching. For example, the 
“earnings mark-up” condition is also met if the second-best-paid apprentice leaves the 
training firm and receives an earnings mark-up at the new firm. Here, the training firm may 
have only planned to hire the best apprentice (“interest to keep” condition) and the second-
best-paid apprentice might just have been lucky with the earnings offer from the outside firm. 
Therefore, we combine both conditions to identify poaching.  
Table 4 shows that for 12.5 per cent of all immediately moving apprenticeship graduates both 
poaching conditions are met. Moreover, poaching is less frequent in more cost-intensive blue-
collar manufacturing occupations (7.3 per cent) than in white-collar occupations (18.5 per 
cent). This implies that poaching is observable for apprentices at training firms with large 
investment in training, but is less widespread for these occupations.  
6 Characteristics of Poaching Victim Firms 
As our main interest is to characterise triggers of and responses to poaching, we turn to the 
establishment-level. Around 3.2 per cent of training firms with at least two apprenticeship 
graduates in the same training occupation and graduation year are victims of poaching. This 
number shows that poaching according to our strict definition does exist, but seems not to be 
widespread in the German apprenticeship system. However, our poaching conditions exclude 
firms that train only one apprenticeship graduate and firms that have no staying 
apprenticeship graduate. These firms are generally considered to run a higher risk of 
poaching. Hence, our number represents a lower bound of poaching. 
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For the following analyses, we define three groups of firms: poaching victim, raiding and 
control firms. Control firms are those firms with at least two apprenticeship graduates in one 
occupation and graduation year cell that successfully retain the best apprenticeship graduate. 
Each of the three groups can contain several observations from one establishment19, but each 
group is exclusive. This means that we delete all firms from the control group that suffer 
poaching in any other year20, and we check that raiding firms are never poaching victims or 
control firms in any other year. 
We start our analysis by comparing poaching victims with raiding firms in order to analyse 
incentives and possibilities for raiding firms to poach apprenticeship graduates. Afterwards, 
we investigate differences between poaching victims and control firms, and focus on the 
question of how firms could prevent poaching of their best apprenticeship graduates. 
Poaching victims vs. raiding firms 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics of poaching victims and raiding firms. There are three 
main differences: First, raiding firms experience employment growth of 4.9 per cent 
compared with a 2.5 per cent decline within poaching victims during the year before 
poaching. However, poaching victim firms are still larger than raiding firms. Second, 
poaching victims train more apprentices as a proportion of all employees (9.7 per cent) than 
raiding firms (3.9 per cent). Despite the lower proportion of apprentices, 83.2 per cent of 
raiding firms train apprentices themselves. Third, raiding firms pay higher earnings than 
poaching victims. This holds for the 25, 50 and 75 per cent earnings quartile for skilled 
employees. Finally, both groups have a similar employment composition. Also the 
multivariate Probit regressions shown in Table 6 confirm that poaching victims are larger but 
shrinking, pay less, and train more than raiders. 
We proceed by investigating the development of these characteristics up to three years before 
and after poaching. Figure 1 illustrates the development of the number of employees. The 
horizontal axis displays the timing, starting three years before poaching until three years after 
poaching which occurs at time zero21. It shows that poaching victims are smaller than raiding 
firms three years before poaching. However, raiding firms grow strongly by 20 per cent in the 
following three years. On the contrary, employment in poaching victims shrinks during the 
                                                 
19 We find, for example, that 78 per cent of poaching victims experience poaching only once, with those 
remaining experiencing poaching twice. 
20 We identify 369 observations of poaching victims as potential control firms in other years. 
21 The figures display one-time victims only. As most two-time victims suffer poaching in two consecutive 
years, including those firms does not change the figures qualitatively. The restriction on one-time victims 
explains small differences in the number of observations in Tables 5 and 6. 
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same period by around 4 per cent. At the time of poaching, raiding firms are larger than 
poaching victims22. After poaching, both groups reduce the number of employees. These 
findings are confirmed in Appendix Table B2, which displays coefficients of being a 
poaching victim on firm size and employment growth in OLS regressions controlling for 
further firm characteristics. The difference in the number of employees between raiding firms 
and poaching victims is insignificant during the seven-year period but employment growth 
significantly differs between both groups in the years before and when poaching happens. 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the proportion of newly recruited apprentices on all 
employees for the same period. Poaching victims train two times more apprentices in 
proportion to all employees, than do raiding firms. This proportion slightly decreases after 
poaching but remains higher for poaching victims than for raiding firms. Appendix Table B2 
analogously shows coefficients of the poaching victim dummy on the share of new training 
places on all employees controlling for additional establishment characteristics. These 
regressions confirm significant differences in apprentice intake between poaching victims and 
raiding firms over the entire observation period. Moreover, poaching does not change training 
participation for poaching victims – less than 4 per cent of poaching victims quit 
apprenticeship training altogether in the three years after poaching23. In accordance with 
Cahuc et al. (1990), we also find no substantial reduction in training efforts of raiders before 
or after the poaching event. 
Poaching victims vs. control firms 
We proceed with differences between poaching victims and control firms. Table 5 shows 
descriptive statistics and Table 7 presents marginal effects after a Probit regression that 
controls for additional establishment characteristics. Poaching victims differ remarkably from 
control firms. Poaching victims have more employees (1,627 to 766), train a higher share of 
apprentices as a proportion of total employment (9.7 to 7.1 per cent) and pay higher earnings 
(99.11 to 91.61 Euros at median) than control firms. Marginal effects after Probit (Table 7, 
column 1) show that 10 per cent higher earnings raise the poaching probability by around 1 
percentage point. An earnings increase by 10 per cent decreases the poaching probability by 
                                                 
22 The level difference is insignificant, however. The different number of observations compared with Table 5 is 
again caused by the selection of one-time victims in this exercise. One-time victims are smaller than multiple 
victims but we cannot define the zero period for multiple victims. 
23 We can only observe the development of wages measured at quartiles in the EHB. The quartiles show a slight 
decrease of median earnings for raiding firms over the seven-year period and an increase for poaching victims. 
However, an analysis with the LIAB data for poaching victims shows that earnings increase in the quartiles 
stems from lay-offs. New recruits and laid-off workers are more likely to be at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution and this appears to drive our entire findings on earnings quartiles. In this line, the earnings decrease 
of raiding firms could stem from hiring. 
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0.07 percentage points. These results can be explained by the workforce reduction of 
poaching victims, which is more likely to affect employees on the lower part of the earnings 
distribution (according to the last-in, first-out principle). Furthermore, employing 1,000 more 
employees increases the poaching probability by only 0.3 percentage points, and an 
employment reduction of 10 per cent reduces the poaching probability by 0.6 percentage 
points. Finally, poaching victims employ significantly more apprentices, females and fewer 
foreign employees. 
We investigate more thoroughly the finding that large firms having high earnings are more 
likely to be poaching victims, and exploit the additional survey information of the IAB 
establishment panel, which we can merge for a sub-sample of 62.8 per cent of firms. Firms in 
the sub-sample are similar to those in the entire sample (Table 7, column 2). Additional 
variables from the establishment survey allow us to control for establishment characteristics 
such as investments, industrial relations and exports (Table 7, column 3). This regression 
confirms that competitive firms with higher investments per capita, a higher export-share and 
with a collective agreement are more likely to be poaching victims. 
We now extend the model in column 1 of Table 7 and take into account time-invariant 
variables that could simultaneously affect poaching and employment reduction, such as 
leadership culture, management quality, incentive and reward systems or general human 
resource practices. Therefore, we estimate a Linear Probability First Difference Model, with 
first differences between the year of poaching and the previous year24. 
The first two columns of Table 8 show results for all firms, and the last two columns for firms 
with blue-collar manufacturing apprentices. Taking firm fixed-effects into account reveals 
additional poaching triggers. The regression in column 2 shows that an employment decrease 
of 10 per cent significantly increases the probability of being a poaching victim by 0.27 
percentage points. Therefore, employment reduction explains around 9 per cent of the overall 
probability of being a poaching victim. Further control variables are no longer significant.  
Our findings also hold if we compare firms that train blue-collar manufacturing apprentices25 
(compare appendix: Table B3 for descriptive statistics and columns 3 and 4 in Table 8). These 
occupations are of particular relevance for poaching because firms have to invest more in 
apprenticeship training in blue-collar manufacturing occupations and therefore have an 
                                                 
24 We use the entire sample as the following regressions also require information in the year before poaching. 
This is too restrictive for the sub-sample with the merged IAB Establishment data. 
25 We can only compare poaching victims and control firms with regard to differences between white- and blue-
collar manufacturing apprentices as we do not have information on the occupation-level for raiding firms. 
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interest in retaining graduates (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009, Schönfeld et al. 2010). This 
makes blue-collar manufacturing apprenticeship graduates more valuable than other graduates 
for training firms and poaching firms alike. In the sub-sample of blue-collar apprentices, 
employment decrease has a comparable impact on poaching. All other variables remain 
insignificant. 
7. Firms’ response to poaching 
Poaching victims, in principle, have three possible responses to poaching: they can reduce 
training expenses, improve retention of attractive apprenticeship graduates by increasing 
earnings of apprentices or skilled entry payments, and/or adjust the number of training 
places26. As we have no establishment-level data on training expenses, our analysis 
concentrates on the latter two responses. 
We continue to analyse differences between poaching victims and control firms. We use the 
following timing approach: firms suffer poaching or fulfil criteria as a control firm in period 0 
and periods 1, 2 and 3 show changes between period 0 and the respective year. We continue 
to apply fixed-effect models as we are interested in responses or changes in behaviour of 
poaching victims controlling for time-invariant factors such as leadership culture and HR 
measures. 
Table 9 presents a fixed-effects model detailing the share of newly hired apprentices. The first 
two columns of Table 9 show estimates for all firms, and the third and fourth columns show 
estimates for firms that train apprentices in blue-collar manufacturing occupations. Columns 2 
and 4 present a richer model, including many establishment characteristics usually associated 
with the training decision of firms. Apprenticeship training is usually a sign of an internal 
labour market characterised by long-term personnel contracts and a low turn-over of skilled 
employees (Moen and Rosen, 2004; Backes-Gellner and Tuor, 2010). Another indicator for 
internal labour markets is the difference between tenure and experience – a larger difference 
means that the employer hires employees with relatively long labour market experience rather 
than developing its own personnel. In addition, training efforts differ by establishment size 
and the qualification structure of employees as well as the share of female, foreign and older 
employees. Poaching victims do not adjust numbers of training places in the year after 
poaching has taken place. However, poaching occurs in spring or summer after the legally 
fixed termination of apprenticeships, but many firms decide about new intakes up to one year 
                                                 
26 Training firms can also adjust their selection criteria for apprentices and the HRM policy to attract 
apprenticeship graduates. Both policies are, unfortunately, not observable with our data. 
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in advance so an immediate response is unlikely. Hence, we expect firms’ responses in the 
following years. In the second year after poaching, poaching victims indeed reduce the share 
of training places on all employees by 0.4 percentage points27, and in the third by 0.6 
percentage points compared with the year of poaching. In the year of poaching, the raw share 
of new apprentice intakes is 3.5 per cent for poaching victims and 2.3 per cent for control 
firms. Three years after poaching, poaching victims still train a larger share of apprentices 
than control firms but they slightly reduce their training efforts. 
These patterns also hold for firms that train apprentices in blue-collar manufacturing 
occupations. The share of intakes is similar in the first year after poaching, then decreases by 
0.7 percentage points in the second and 1.3 percentage points in the third years. The reduction 
is twice that of the entire sample. 
Furthermore, poaching victims also can increase earnings for apprenticeship graduates in their 
first job as an attempt to counter raid attempts by outsider firms. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 
present fixed-effects earnings regressions up to three years after poaching compared with 
control firms again for parsimonious and richer specifications. Columns 3 and 4 repeat these 
regressions for firms with blue-collar manufacturing apprentices. Poaching victims do not 
adjust earnings of apprenticeship graduates in response to poaching. We also find no 
differences between occupations. 
 
Robustness checks 
We run a series of robustness checks with regard to our definition of poaching: First, we relax 
our rather strong poaching conditions. Instead of the first condition that “the leaving best 
apprentice” has to earn more than the best staying apprenticeship graduate, we now request 
that the leaving apprenticeship graduate has to earn more than the mean within a 
firm/occupation/graduation year cell at the end of the apprenticeship. Around 50 per cent 
more apprenticeship graduates who change employer meet the weaker condition. This 
recalculation leads to 4.2 per cent poaching victims. However, the results on triggers of, and 
responses to, poaching remain robust. 
Second, we test whether our results hold for a more restrictive occupation classification. We 
run the analysis with the more precise 3-digit occupation code. As a general rule, blue-collar 
manufacturing or service occupations with the same 2-digit but different 3-digit codes are 
                                                 
27 The decrease in the second year after poaching remains insignificant, however. 
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usually only different specialisations of similar occupations28. Different specialisations could 
be seen as substitutes for potential raiding firms. A 3-digit code is, therefore, less appropriate 
for our kind of analysis. However, using a 3-digit code does not change our main results29. 
8. Consequences for the labour market 
Our results suggest that poaching is not just a theoretical construct, it does happen even in 
economies with a high-skill, high-training equilibrium such as Germany30. However, the 
extent of poaching is rather modest, occurring in around 3 per cent of training firms. 
We show that poaching victims are in a temporary downturn, whereas raiding firms strongly 
grow during the years before poaching. As apprenticeship training usually takes at least three 
years, raiding firms might have been too pessimistic and poaching victims too optimistic 
about their skilled labour demand when poached apprentices were hired. This argument is 
supported by the response of poaching victims to poaching – they slightly reduce the share of 
apprentice intake but they do not increase entry payments of skilled labour market entrants 
nor quit training participation altogether. 
We further find that poaching victims are larger firms that train more apprentices and pay 
more than comparable firms that manage to keep their best apprentices. High-paying training 
firms attract apprentices from the upper end of the ability distribution and they are usually 
considered to be high-quality training firms in “normal” times (Soskice, 1994; Smits, 2006)31. 
Their apprenticeship graduates are seen to be worthwhile poaching prey. Outsider firms may 
only dare to poach, or may only be successful and able to poach, if a high-quality training 
firm shows temporary signs of vulnerability. Outsider firms might exploit the current 
weakness of poaching victims and hire well-trained apprenticeship graduates. This 
interpretation suits the first poaching condition that poaching victims keep apprenticeship 
graduates of a cohort but are not able to retain the best graduate. Furthermore, poaching 
victims do not adjust entry wages of retained apprenticeship graduates in the first skilled job 
after recovering from economic weakness. 
                                                 
28 This does not hold for crafts occupations. Our sample, however, consists of rather large firms that rarely train 
apprentices in crafts occupations. 
29 The robustness of earnings estimations regarding the 2-, 3- or 4-digit occupational code for apprentices is also 
shown by Wydra-Somaggio and Seibert (2010). 
30 See Finegold and Soskice (1988), Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) or Culpepper (1999) for country differences 
in training. 
31 School-leavers in poaching victim firms are more likely to be positively selected. Around 27.2 per cent of all 
apprentices in poaching victim firms have a university entrance diploma compared with 21.1 per cent in control 
firms (t = 1.98). 
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These insights are important because they solve a much cited puzzle – how is it possible that a 
high training equilibrium with investment in apprenticeship training is not put into question 
by the possibility of poaching? Our answer is that poaching occurs only sporadically and 
poaching victims are not “typical” victims but high-quality training firms in a temporary 
economic downturn. They reduce their training efforts after a poaching event but only to the 
level of comparable firms that did not experience poaching. Therefore, the overall importance 
of poaching on expected returns to apprenticeship training and firms’ training decisions seems 
to be negligible. 
9. Conclusions 
This paper presents the first empirical evidence of the existence of poaching. It estimates a 
lower bound of poaching, describes poaching victim and raiding firm characteristics and 
analyses triggers of, and responses to, poaching. The paper identifies employees a training 
firm wishes to retain by their relative productivity position in a homogeneous comparison 
group. We identify relative productivity of apprentices using relative earnings differences 
between apprentices who perform the same job in the same firm and graduation year. The 
skilled entry payments of those apprentices who stay in the training firm serves as 
counterfactual earnings poached employees would have got had they stayed. 
We define poaching when two conditions are met. The apprenticeship graduates who change 
to another employer, first, have to earn a higher wage at the end of the apprenticeship period 
and, second, have to earn more in the first regular skilled full-time job after graduation than 
their peers in the same training establishment, occupation and graduation year. The paper 
shows that at least 3 per cent of the training firms suffer poaching. This share represents a 
lower bound because our poaching conditions restrict our sample to large firms that are 
generally considered to be less exposed to poaching than small firms. 
Furthermore, we show that poaching victims employ more employees and pay higher earnings 
than firms that are able to retain their best apprenticeship graduates. Instead, the vulnerability 
of poaching victims stems from a current economic weakness indicated by a workforce 
reduction. During a temporary downsize, training firms may not be able to make counter-
offers for apprenticeship graduates with attractive outside offers even if they would like to 
retain them. Moreover, as the high quality of training and initial screening of large and high-
earnings firms is well-known in local labour markets, outsider firms exploit this current 
weakness and are willing to pay a lot for well-trained apprenticeship graduates they otherwise 
would not be able to attract. Finally, poaching victims respond to poaching by slightly 
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reducing the share of new apprentice intakes as a proportion of all employees. They do not 
adjust earnings for apprenticeship graduates in their first jobs as skilled employees, nor do 
they quit training altogether. 
This paper contributes to the empirical training literature by presenting feasible and 
innovative conditions to empirically identify poaching. It therefore provides an empirical 
strategy to identify relative productivity differences of apprentices within firms. It confirms 
theoretical finding of a coexistence of poaching and firm-sponsored training investments and 
points to a low incidence of poaching in a high training equilibrium country. The current 
economic difficulties of poaching victims and the small poaching incidence lead us to the 
conclusion that poaching has no strong influence on firms’ training decisions and expected 
returns to training. 
The transfer of our identification strategy of poaching to other training systems in countries 
with an established dual apprenticeship training system such as Switzerland or Austria or 
countries without a comparable system such as the Anglo-Saxon countries or Sweden might 
be interesting. We cannot analyse with our data whether potential poaching or a poaching 
experience are an important reason for establishments not to train at all. Moreover, our 
poaching conditions permit only the identification of a lower bound of the extent of poaching 
and restrict the analysis to large firms. Strategies of small and low-paying firms for handling 
the poaching threat may differ. 
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Table 1: Earnings dispersion of apprenticeship graduates at the end of the apprenticeship 
within establishment/occupation/year cells. 




Daily earnings in Euros. Sample restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates 
in each establishment/occupation/year cell. N = 26,609. The mover finds his or her new job in the training 
occupation within 10 days after apprenticeship termination. Source: own calculations of the LIAB longitudinal 
version 2 1999-2003. 
 
 
Table 2: Proportion of best apprenticeship graduates who leave the training firm. 
Occupation Proportion 
Blue-collar manufacturing 0.242 
White-collar 0.413 
Total 0.339 
Apprenticeship graduates who earn more than the staying apprenticeship graduates within an 
occupation/establishment cell at the end of the apprenticeship as a proportion of all immediate movers. Sample 
restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each 
occupation/establishment cell. N = 2,465. The mover finds his or her new job in the training occupation within 




Table 3: Proportion of immediately switching apprenticeship graduates who receive an 
earnings mark-up. 
Occupation Proportion 
Blue-collar manufacturing 0.225 
White-collar 0.403 
Total 0.302 
Apprenticeship graduates who earn more than all the staying apprenticeship graduates within an 
occupation/establishment cell at first full-time employment as a proportion of all immediate movers. Sample 
restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each 
occupation/establishment cell. N = 2,465. The mover finds his or her new job in the training occupation within 




Table 4: Proportions of poached apprenticeship graduates by occupation group. 
Occupation group Proportion 
Blue-collar manufacturing  0.073 
White-collar  0.185 
Total 0.125 
Proportion of poached apprenticeship graduates who receive higher earnings at the end of the apprenticeship and 
higher earnings at their first employment as a skilled worker than the staying apprenticeship graduates in the 
training firm. Sample restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each 
occupation/ establishment cell. N = 2465. The mover finds his or her new job in the training occupation within 
10 days after apprenticeship termination. Source: own calculations on the basis of the LIAB longitudinal version 
2 1999-2003. 
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Table 5: Descriptive characteristics of poaching victims, raiding firms and control group 
establishments.  
  Poaching 
victim  
Raiding firm Control group 





























Employee growth to previous year 

















































Number of observations 







Mean, and standard deviation in parenthesis; identification of groups based on the longitudinal version 2 of the 
LIAB, source: EHB 1999-2003. 
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Table 6: Characteristics of poaching victims in comparison with raiding firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) 





Median earnings for skilled employees   -0.005 
(2.07) 
 
Third quartile earnings for skilled 
employees 
  -0.004 
(1.95) 




























































Sector and year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 







Pseudo R square 0.32 0.31 0.31 
Marginal effects after Probit. Dependent variable: firm was poaching victim (1) and raiding firm (0). 
Marginal effects calculated at the mean, standard errors clustered on establishment, z-values in parenthesis. 
Identification of groups based on the longitudinal version 2 of the LIAB, source: EHB 1999-2003. 
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Table 7: Characteristics of poaching victims in comparison with control firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) 




































































Positive business expectations   0.001 
(0.37) 
Ln(investments)   0.001 
(1.70) 
Export share on sales   0.001 
(2.18) 
Works council   0.001 
(0.12) 
Collective agreement   0.011 
(2.99) 
Payment above collective agreement   -0.005 
(1.83) 
Sector and year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 






Pseudo R2 0.17 0.24 0.27 
 
Marginal effects after Probit, dependent variable: 1 if firm was poaching victim, 0 if control group. Standard 
errors clustered on establishment, z-values in parenthesis. Identification based on the longitudinal version 2 of 
the LIAB, source: EHB 1999-2003. 
 28 
Table 8: Causes of poaching: poaching victims in comparison with control group. 
 All firms  Firms with blue-collar 
apprentices 


















Churning of skilled employees  -0.014 
(1.91) 
  -0.001 
(0.70) 
Share of skilled employees  -0.032 
(0.61) 
  -0.107 
(1.48) 
Share of part-time employees  -0.022 
(0.27) 
  -0.078 
(0.60) 




  0.042 
(0.37) 
Share of foreign employees  0.044 
(0.32) 
  -0.081 
(0.49) 
Share of female employees  0.151 
(1.64) 
  0.196 
(1.49) 
Sector and year dummies  Yes   Yes 
Number of observations 6570 6570  4202 4202 
Number of groups 1714 1714  734 734 
within R² 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
Prob (u_i ==0) 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Linear probability first difference regressions, dependent variable: 1 poaching victim, 0 control group (interacted 
with the time effect). Sample restriction: all firms of control group and poaching victims if they have not 
suffered poaching in the previous year, standard errors clustered on establishment, t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
 29 
Table 9: Establishments’ responses to poaching: the share of newly hired apprentices.  
 All firms  Firms with blue-collar 
apprentices 















































Average difference between 
experience and tenure of 
skilled employees/1,000  
0.002 
(1.79)   
0.003 
(2.33) 




































Number of observation 










Within R² 0.25 0.26 
 
0.30 0.31 
Prob (u_i ==0) 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Fixed effects regressions, dependent variable: share of newly recruited apprentices on all employees. Sample 
restriction: all firms of control group and poaching victims if no poaching occurs in the following years, standard 
errors clustered on establishment, t-values in parenthesis. Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 10: Establishments’ responses to poaching: earnings of apprenticeship graduates in 
their first job.  
 All firms  Firms with blue-collar 
apprentices 





















Ln(number of employees)  
0.036 
(3.91)   
-0.0001 
(0.00) 
Churning of skilled 
employees  
-0.009 
(1.89)   
-0.008 
(1.27) 
Average tenure of skilled 
employees/1,000  
-0.019 
(3.28)   
-0.023 
(3.06) 
Average difference between 
experience and tenure of 
skilled employees/1,000 
 0.013 (1.75)   
-0.008 
(0.84) 
Share of skilled employees  
0.016 
(0.39)   
-0.107 
(1.84) 
Share of part-time 
employees 
 0.018 
(0.37)   
-0.056 
(0.72) 
Share of employees older 
than 55  
-0.0001 
(0.02)   
-0.003 
(0.04) 
Share of foreign employees  
-0.017 
(0.15)   
-0.156 
(1.01) 
Share of female employees  
-0.180 
(2.76)   
-0.055 
(0.59) 
Number of observation 









Within R² 0.01 0.01  0.004 0.01 
Prob (u_i ==0) 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Fixed effects regressions, dependent variable: log earnings deviation of newly recruited apprentices to 
occupation median. Sample restriction: all firms of control group and poaching victims if their observation in the 
following years was not poaching again, standard errors clustered on establishment, t-values in parenthesis. 
Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Figure 1: Development of the firm size before and after poaching incidence (period 0).  
 
N = 94 poaching victims and N = 121 raiding firms, only one-time raiding firms and one-time poaching victims. 




Figure 2: Development of the proportion of newly recruited apprentices before and after 
poaching incidence (period 0). 
 
N = 94 poaching victims and N = 121 raiding firms, only firms that poach only once or were only one-time 




Validation for the interpretation of relative earnings differences as relative productivity 
differences within an establishment/occupation/year cell 
In this section, we present a couple of justifications for our hypothesis that the relative 
earnings rank in an establishment/ occupation/ graduation year cell is a sufficient predictor for 
relative productivity of apprentices in this cell. First, we show that firms are more likely to 
retain apprenticeship graduates with a high earnings position in a cell, and, second, that 
earnings deviation at the end of the apprenticeship explains earnings in the first job as a 
skilled worker. 
First, Table A1 shows that relative earnings in a cell are positively correlated with the 
probability of staying with the training firm. Firms want to retain the most productive 
apprentices as skilled employees. Firms’ assessment of apprentices’ productivity leads to 
higher relative payment within a cell and a higher probability to stay with the training firm 
(Kahn, 2013). This confirms the hypothesis that training firms, on average, retain the most 
productive apprentices rather than the least productive ones. Leaving a training company can 
be interpreted as a stigma and training firms have an information advantage regarding the 
productivity of their apprentices (Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). In 
this line, Wagner and Zwick (2012) analyse the earnings rank of apprenticeship graduates and 
their earnings in their first jobs as skilled employees. They show that the higher the share of 
retained apprentices, the more negatively selected are those who leave the training firm. 
Moreover, they show that the relative earnings position at the end of the apprenticeship has a 
significant positive impact not only on skilled entry earnings for those who stay with the 
training employer but also for the entire group of apprenticeship graduates. When skilled 
entry earnings reflect the market value (productivity) of an employee, we can conclude that 
our measure reflects productivity differences of apprentices at the end of the apprenticeship 
period when training firms are informed about relative productivity of their apprentices. 
Second, the earnings rank of stayers at the end of the apprenticeship also predicts first full-
time earnings of stayers (Table A2). Furthermore, a Spearman Rank Correlation Test shows 
that the earnings rank remains stable between the end of the apprenticeship and the first full-
time employment of stayers within a cell (Table A3).  
Obviously, we have to discuss why firms differentiate between the earnings of their 
apprentices, despite earnings being determined by collective bargaining or other rules that 
prohibit undercutting of certain earnings levels. Our argument is that training firms use their 
information advantage on relative productivity differences between their apprentices by 
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voluntarily sharing a part of the additional rent created by more able apprentices (Farber and 
Gibbons, 1986). This could give training enterprises a head start on the labour market after the 
end of the apprenticeship period because more able apprentices feel more obliged to stay or 
they are more loyal according to gift exchange considerations (Akerlof, 1984; Mohrenweiser 
and Zwick, 2013). In addition, an earnings mark-up during apprenticeship training might 
compensate any exogenous negative utility encountered by apprentices in training firms that 
could induce them to quit (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Contini et al. 2011; Dustmann and 
Schönberg, 2012; Kahn, 2013;). Supporting evidence for this hypothesis is that earnings 
mark-ups increase absolutely and relatively with the duration of the apprenticeship period and 
reach a maximum just before apprenticeship termination (Figure A1 and Mohrenweiser and 
Zwick, 2013 for a more detailed discussion). 
We interpret the payment difference as relative productivity difference because these 
apprentices learn the same job and the Vocational Training Act determines tasks that 
apprentices should perform and learn during each stage of apprenticeship. Therefore, earnings 
of two apprentices in the same occupation do not differ because both perform different 
tasks32. Moreover, apprenticeship graduates in the same training occupation in one firm are 
practically identical in terms of observable variables such as age, education, start of 
apprenticeship and prior working experience33. In addition, many employers have explicit 
financial bonus rules for good grades at vocational school or good performance at work 
(Ryan, 2011; Backes-Gellner and Oswald, 2012; Ryan et al., 2013). Ryan et al. (2013) present 
evidence for individual and group-related performance pay for apprentices in 13 out of 18 
analysed engineering and retailing firms in Germany. 
Furthermore, we collect information about the internal validity of our interpretation of 
earnings differences in interviews with several personal managers in training firms. Personal 
managers confirm that all apprentices in the same training year receive the same salary, 
according to collective agreements. However, many firms pay a number of bonuses for good 
performance by apprentices. For example, several managers described bonuses for good 
grades at vocational school and bonuses for project work34. Moreover, many firms send their 
apprentices abroad for some weeks in the final training year. Firms state that apprentices who 
                                                 
32 The earnings definition in the LIAB data entails full-time earnings for apprentices. A fraction of apprentices 
might receive additional bonuses or work extra hours. This overtime, weekend or shift work payment might 
partly account for the wage differences between apprentices at the end of the apprenticeship. However, overtime 
payment is more likely for the more productive apprentices. The imprecision in the earnings measure therefore 
does not invalidate our measure. 
33 Compare appendix Table A4 which displays a regression of individual characteristics on the earnings of 
apprentices.  
34 These bonuses may only imprecisely measure the productivity but they are highly correlated to productivity. 
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are sent abroad are a positive selection, that working abroad therefore is a reward for good 
performance and that it is accompanied by additional payments according to collective 
agreements. Finally, Ryan et al. (2013) analyse apprentice payment in a case study and find 
remarkable earnings variation that is positively correlated with the productivity of 
apprentices. Backes-Gellner and Oswald (2012) also find earnings bonuses for grades in 
vocational schools and exploit this finding in a natural experiment.  
 
 
Table A1: Probability of staying in the training firm. 
  Coef. (z-Value) 
Earnings deviation from cell mean 0.04  (2.78) 
Age -0.001  (0.20) 
Age squared -0.001  (1.55) 
Male 0.056  (3.67) 
Foreigner 0.185  (0.91) 
Occupation and year dummies Yes 
Observations 32998 
Pseudo R2 0.01 
Marginal effects after Probit estimation; dependent variable: 1 apprentice stays in the training firm, 0 apprentice 
switches immediately after graduation, Standard errors clustered on establishment, t-values in parenthesis. 
Sample restriction: only firms with at least one staying and one leaving apprenticeship graduate, Source: LIAB 




Table A2: Earnings deviation from establishment/occupation/year mean in the first full-time 
employment for staying apprenticeship graduates. 
  Coef. (t-Value) 
Deviation from establishment/occupation/year 
mean at the end of the apprenticeship 
0.054  (11.20) 
Age -0.361  (0.88) 
Age squared 0.063  (2.05) 
Male 1.789  (4.38) 
Foreigner 5.544  (7.03) 
Constant 52.66  (10.41) 
Observations 25509 
Adjusted R2 0.33 
OLS regression; dependent variable: deviation from establishment/occupation/year mean earnings in the first 
full-time employment. Standard errors clustered on establishment, t-values in parenthesis. Sample restriction: 
staying apprenticeship graduates in firms with at least two staying apprenticeship graduates, Source: LIAB 
longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
 
 
Table A3: The stability of stayer wages before and after the end of the apprenticeship period.  
Spearman Rank Correlation 
Coefficients Test 
Spearman’s Rho 0.3494 
p-value 0.0000 
Kendall’s Rank Correlation 
Coefficients Test 
Kendall’s tau-a 0.2391 
Kendall’s tau-b 0.2392 
z-value 0.0000 
Comparison between the earnings rank at the end of the apprenticeship and the first full-time employment after 
the apprenticeship of stayers in the same occupation. Number of observations: 26,609 all stayers in 
establishments with at least two apprenticeship graduates. Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003. 
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Table A4: Determinants of apprentices’ wages within an establishment, occupation and year 
cell. 
  Coef. (t-Value) 
Age 0.102  (0.18) 
Age squared 0.004  (0.29) 
Male 0.204  (1.26)  
Foreigner 1.093  (3.84) 
Constant 16.70  (2.56) 
Observations 32959 
Adjusted R2 0.24 
OLS regression; dependent variable: daily earnings at the end of the apprenticeship. Standard errors clustered on 
establishment, t-values in parenthesis, Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
 
 
Figure A1: Development of earnings variance of apprentices within an 
occupation/establishment/year cell. 
 
Figure from Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2013), based on the same sample. N = 4223 cells (Panel A) and N = 6494 
cells (Panel B); each cell contains at least three apprentices learning in the same establishment, occupation and 
graduation year. The data source contains annual earnings. Therefore, year 1 means the time period from start of 
apprenticeship (usually in August or September) till the end of the calendar year, the following periods are the 
respective following calendar years, the last period is earnings between January and graduation usually in 
February or March (3.5 year apprenticeships) and June or July (3-year apprenticeships). Source: LIAB 
longitudinal version 2, 1999-2006. 
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Appendix B: Supplementary material 
 
Table B1: Descriptive comparisons between stayers and movers. 













Stayer  80.64 28.60 72.43 
Mover within 10 days, same occupation  7.47 28.79 69.44 
Mover within 10 days, occupational switcher 3.20 26.63 57.08 
Mover with unemployment spell of more 
than 10 days, same occupation  3.85 27,04 70.59 
Mover with unemployment spell of more 
than 10 days, occupational switcher  4.00 25.65 52.25 
Out of labour force during observation period 0.84 26.99 --- 
Sample restrictions: at least two (one moving and one staying) apprenticeship graduates in each 
establishment/occupation/year cell. N = 32,998, Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003. 
 
 
Table B2: Differences in employment growth, number of employees and share of new 
training positions between raiding firms and poaching victims before and after 




Number of employees 
 Share of new training 
positions 
Time Coef. T-value 
 
Coef. T-value  Coef. t-Value 
t-3 -0.105 1.69 
 
152.93 0.46  0.017 5.07 
t-2 -0.089 1.69 
 
161.18 0.48  0.025 5.78 
t-1 -0.086 2.28 
 
27.72 0.08  0.019 4.71 
t -0.136 3.68 
 
-57.48 0.15  0.019 4.09 
t+1 -0.028 1.11 
 
37.58 0.10  0.019 4.27 
t+2 0.018 0.79 
 
-206.41 0.51  0.018 5.12 
t+3 -0.029 0.64 
 
-126.98 0.32  0.017 4.55 
OLS Regressions, N = 215, further control variables: number of employees, employment growth, churning of 
skilled employees, proportion of female, foreign and part-time employees, proportion of skilled and high-skilled 
employees , t-values in parenthesis. Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table B3: Descriptive differences between poaching victims and control firms that train 
apprentices in blue-collar manufacturing occupations.  
  Poaching 
victims  
Control group 




Employee growth to previous year 





















































Number of observations 54 2214 
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; identification based on the longitudinal version 2 of the LIAB, 
source: EHB 1999-2003. 
 
